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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

POST-PANDEMIC, BUT NOT POST-RACIAL
COURTNEY LAUREN ANDERSON*
ABSTRACT
The Fair Housing Rights Act and the Voting Rights Act have had measurable
success in providing opportunities to address intentional discrimination in
housing and voting contexts. Plaintiffs with evidence of direct illegalities have
clear frameworks under which justice may be sought, and both Acts provide a
path for relief upon violations of housing and voting rights because of one’s
membership in a protected class. However, the disparate impact theories that
are cognizable under both Acts have been scrutinized for lackluster results.
Practitioners and academicians have written about and experienced the
difficulties plaintiffs face in successfully proving that a particular housing
practice or policy is the cause of specific discriminatory outcomes, given the
interrelated factors that give rise to segregation. Similarly, the gutting of the
preclearance requirements in the Voting Rights Act, coupled with the onslaught
of voter suppression legislation in the last few years, create obstacles to satisfy
the complicated “totality of the circumstances” test required to evidence
disparate impact under the Voting Rights Act. In addition to critiquing the limits
of each Act, this Article explains how racial disparities in poverty and health
are exacerbated by these limitations. Systems and individuals seeking to exploit
people of color through oppressive housing and voting laws rely on the failure
of the Fair Housing Act and Voting Rights Act to eradicate segregation, with
determinants in each sphere perpetuating the discrimination within the other.
The Article sets forth federal action that can be taken to mitigate these inequities.

* Courtney Anderson is an associate professor at Georgia State University College of Law.
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I. INTRODUCTION
As a result of discrimination in several contexts, neighborhoods in the
United States are racially segregated, causing predominantly Black
neighborhoods to be under-resourced and resulting in detrimental health
outcomes. 1 Individual responsibility for mobility to leave one’s current situation
is evidenced by aspirational anthems such as “vote with your feet” 2 and “pull
yourself up by your bootstraps.” 3 However, structural conditions have erected
barriers to such upward trajectory for Black people and people with low or no
incomes. 4 Disparate impact theories were developed, in part, to provide recourse
for obstacles that, while facially neutral, negatively affect people of color at
higher rates than white people. 5 However, when there are systems that rely on
continued racism in order to perpetuate the goals of the oppressor, the
weaknesses of disparate impact become evident. 6
This is the case with housing and voting. There are correlation versus
causation parallels in the disparate impact discussion within these two systems. 7
Although one may bring a disparate impact claim under the Fair Housing Act,
the ability of a plaintiff to prevail under the Court’s framework is dubious given
the limited scope within which culpability lies. 8 The Voting Rights Act of 1965
(VRA) provides relief for people of color who can show their voting rights have
been restricted due to racist laws, policies, or practices. 9 Yet, the Supreme
Court’s ruling in Shelby County v. Holder has eradicated the federal oversight

1. Algernon Austin, African Americans Are Still Concentrated in Neighborhoods with High
Poverty and Still Lack Full Access to Decent Housing, ECON. POL’Y INST. (July 22, 2013),
https://www.epi.org/publication/african-americans-concentrated-neighborhoods/.
2. Ilya Somin, How Foot Voting Enhances Political Freedom, 56 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1089,
1090 (2019).
3. Shervin Assari, Why It’s Hard for Blacks to Pull Themselves Up by Bootstraps When It
Comes to Health, INST. FOR HEALTHCARE POL’Y & INNOVATION UNIV. MICH. (Sept. 4, 2018),
https://ihpi.umich.edu/news/why-its-hard-blacks-pull-themselves-bootstraps-when-it-comeshealth.
4. Janae Ladet, To Equitably Connect Housing and Economic Mobility for Black Americans,
Tackle Structural Racism, HOUS. MATTERS (Feb. 8, 2018), https://housingmatters.urban.org
/articles/equitably-connect-housing-and-economic-mobility-black-americans-tackle-structuralracism.
5. Michael J. Perry, The Disproportionate Impact Theory of Racial Discrimination, 125 U.
PENN. L. REV. 540, 558 (1977).
6. Andre M. Perry, How Can We Hold Those Who Benefit from Racism Accountable?,
BROOKINGS (Mar. 27, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/the-avenue/2018/03/27/how-canwe-hold-those-who-benefit-from-racism-accountable/.
7. Javier M. Rodriguez et al., Black Lives Matter: Differential Mortality and the Racial
Composition of the U.S. Electorate, 1970–2004, SOC. SCI & MED., Apr. 2015, at 193, 196.
8. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affs. v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project Inc., No. 13–1371, slip op.
at 2 (U.S. June 25, 2015).
9. Shelby Cnty. Ala. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 529 (2013).
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of initially enacting such procedures. 10 Racism inherent to voting and housing
systems creates cyclical, negative reverberations for Black people while
providing a pathway that circumvents disparate impact liability. 11 The physical
concentration of Black people in a community helps to provide a non-racist
justification for the creation of voting districts that reduce the political power of
that community. 12 Likewise, the reduction of political power in a community
complicates the ability to effectuate the change needed to improve one’s
surroundings or obtain representation reflective of the community’s values. 13
The totality of circumstances and specific causation required to prove disparate
impact in voting and housing contexts, respectively, is therefore obscured by
each system’s reliance on the other’s discriminatory patterns. 14 Specific
consequences of this regime are the adverse health outcomes suffered by its
victims. 15
Many studies conducted regarding the effects of the pandemic proved that
although COVID-19 could affect anyone, the virus and its indirect end products
harmed the health and quality of life for Black people at disproportionately high
rates. 16 This is attributable, in large part, to systemic racism. 17 As we move
towards a post-pandemic society, it is necessary to apply this knowledge to avoid
many post-racial assumptions that also lead to poor health, housing, and voting
rights for people of color. 18
In Part II, this Article will discuss poverty inequities and the fallout of
residential segregation with respect to health. Part III will describe the Fair
Housing Act of 1968 (FHA) and the challenges of succeeding in bringing a
disparate impact claim under this Act. Part IV will discuss the purpose of the
Voting Rights Act of 1965 and the difficulties faced when asserting a claim
under this Act, as well as restrictive voting measures and the relationship
10. Id. at 590–94.
11. Brnovich v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 141 S. Ct. 2321, 2357 (2021).
12. See Kim Soffen, How Racial Gerrymandering Deprives Black People of Political Power,
WASH. POST (June 9, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/06/09/how-awidespread-practice-to-politically-empower-african-americans-might-actually-harm-them/
(explaining how increasing the number of Black people in a district reduces the political power of
these communities in neighboring districts.).
13. Id.
14. Brnovich, 141 S. Ct. at 2359.
15. See Jordyn Imhoff, Health Inequality Actually Is a “Black and White Issue”, Research
Says, MICH. MED. (June 3, 2020, 1:34PM), https://healthblog.uofmhealth.org/lifestyle/health-in
equality-actually-a-black-and-white-issue-research-says.
16. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Health Equity Considerations and Racial and
Ethnic Minority Groups, COVID-19 (Jan. 25, 2022), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov
/community/health-equity/race-ethnicity.html.
17. Shin Bin Tan et al., Structural Racism and COVID-19 in the USA: A County-Level
Empirical Analysis, 9 J. RACIAL & ETHNIC HEALTH DISPARITIES 236, 244 (2022).
18. Id. at 245.
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between voting and health. This Article concludes with an argument for a return
to federal oversight of voting rights as an approach to alleviate certain racial
disparities that cannot be easily mitigated through currently available channels.
II. THE INEQUITIES OF SEGREGATION AND POVERTY
In the United States, 37.2 million people live in poverty, approximately
11.4% of the population. 19 Between 2019 and 2020, the poverty rate increased
for non-Hispanic whites and Latinos; Black people have the highest poverty rate
at 19.5%. 20 Non-Hispanic white people have a poverty rate of 8.2%. 21 In 2019,
the median white household earned about thirty-nine percent more than the
median Black household. 22 Generally, people of color more often live in both
poverty and segregated neighborhoods. 23 This creates an opportunity to leverage
physical separateness in ways that maximize Black voter dilution. 24 Segregated
living patterns are then perpetuated because it is difficult to prove both
intentionally racist behavior and that a certain housing policy is the cause of such
segregation. 25 As a result, concentrated poverty prevails, creating unhealthy
living environments for communities of color. 26
Plessy v. Ferguson is a United States Supreme Court case that
unsuccessfully challenged a Louisiana law that segregated railroad passenger
cars and made famous the doctrine of “separate but equal.” 27 Although such
explicit segregation is now illegal, and such findings of unconstitutional

19. EMILY A. SHRIDER ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, P60-273, INCOME AND POVERTY IN
2020 14 (2021).
20. Id. at 16.
21. Id.
22. Valerie Wilson, Racial Disparities in Income and Poverty Remain Largely Unchanged
Amid Strong Income Growth in 2019, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Sept. 16, 2020, 10:49 AM),
https://www.epi.org/blog/racial-disparities-in-income-and-poverty-remain-largely-unchangedamid-strong-income-growth-in-2019/.
23. Neighborhood Poverty: All Neighborhoods Should Be Communities of Opportunity,
NAT’L EQUITY ATLAS, https://nationalequityatlas.org/indicators/Neighborhood_poverty#/ (last
visited Jan. 22, 2022).
24. Elizabeth Oltmans Ananat & Ebonya L. Washington, Segregation and Black Political
Efficacy 15, 23 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 13,606, 2007).
25. Tell Me More, The Difficulties of Proving Housing Discrimination, NPR, at 01:55 (Feb.
8, 2013, 12:00PM), https://www.npr.org/2013/02/08/171478361/the-difficulties-of-provinghousing-discrimination; Nick Bourland, When Causation Is Too “Robust”: Disparate Impact in
the Crosshairs in De Reyes, 20 CUNY L. REV. F. 132, 133 (2017).
26. Richard D. Kahlenberg & Kimberly Quick, Attacking the Black-White Opportunity Gap
That Comes from Residential Segregation, CENTURY FOUND. (June 25, 2019), https://tcf.org/
content/report/attacking-black-white-opportunity-gap-comes-residential-segregation/; U.S. Dep’t
of Hous. & Urb. Dev., Understanding Neighborhood Effects of Concentrated Poverty, OFF. POL’Y
DEV. & RSCH., https://www.huduser.gov/portal/periodicals/em/winter11/highlight2.html (last
visited Jan. 22, 2022).
27. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 540, 548 (1896).
THE UNITED STATES:
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segregation exist squarely within the housing context, residential segregation is
still prevalent today. 28 The 1950s brought the growth of suburbs, which were
characterized by homeowners’ associations that created and enforced rules for
the residents. 29 Explicit racial discrimination in these developments was
successfully mitigated with the case of Shelley v. Kraemer, holding that a private
homeowners’ covenant not to sell to a non-white person was illegal. 30 The
Supreme Court found this covenant to be in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 31 Since this decision, such associations are prevented from having
rules that are racially discriminatory. 32 Many Black, Latino and Asian-American
people have since moved from major metropolitan areas to the suburbs. 33 This
transition has resulted in a fairly recent phenomenon that is marked by racial
segregation in suburban neighborhoods, 34 as many of these neighborhoods have
become either predominantly Black, Latino, or Asian-American. 35
For several years, discrimination against Black people by private individuals
and all levels of government has created obstacles to home ownership for Black
people. 36 Although racially restrictive covenants, redlining, and other explicit
discriminatory policies and practices are illegal, other systems that are inherently
discriminatory continue to obstruct equitable access to home ownership. 37
People of color “are more likely than white people to be extremely low-income
renters,” which is defined as “those with incomes at or below the poverty level
or 30% of the area’s median income.” 38 A disproportionately high number of
28. Kahlenberg & Quick, supra note 26.
29. See EVAN MCKENZIE, PRIVATOPIA: HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATIONS AND THE RISE OF
RESIDENTIAL PRIVATE GOVERNMENT 57, 128–29 (Marian Ash & John S. Covell eds., Yale Univ.
Press 1994) (discussing the growing prevalence of common interest housing developments which
often led to racist restrictions on homeownership in these developments.).
30. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948).
31. Id. at 23.
32. See Michael C. Pollack, Judicial Deference and Institutional Character: Homeowners
Associations and the Puzzle of Private Governance, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 839, 842–43 (2013); Paul
Boudreaux, Homes, Rights, and Private Communities, 20 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 479, 532
(2009).
33. See Kim Parker et al., Demographic and Economic Trends in Urban, Suburban and Rural
Communities, PEW RSCH. CTR. (May 22, 2018), https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2018/05/22
/demographic-and-economic-trends-in-urban-suburban-and-rural-communities/ (citing statistics
that about fifty-five percent of the U.S. population was suburban as of 2016); see infra Part III (for
a discussion of black suburbanization).
34. Parker, supra note 33; see infra Part III (for a discussion of black suburbanization).
35. Parker, supra note 33; see infra Part III (for a discussion of black suburbanization).
36. Lisa Rice & Deidre Swesnik, Discriminatory Effects of Credit Scoring, 46 SUFFOLK U. L.
REV. 935, 936 (2013).
37. Id. at 936–37.
38. Racial Disparities Among Extremely Low-Income Renters, NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUS.
COAL. (Apr. 15, 2019), https://nlihc.org/resource/racial-disparities-among-extremely-low-incomerenters.
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people of color live in high poverty neighborhoods. 39 Poverty is correlated with
adverse physical and mental health effects, such as obesity and greater
incidences of heart disease, as well as being less personally satisfied. 40 Beyond
physical and mental health effects, residing in a high poverty neighborhood
weakens one’s social health as well. 41 These residents have less access to assets,
resources, and networks that are crucial for mobility. 42 The aggregated negative
effects of these conditions can affect various aspects of one’s life and social
capital:
The outcomes associated with living in areas of concentrated poverty are well
documented and extend to non-poor as well as poor residents of these
communities. These include: diminished school quality and academic
achievement; diminished health and healthcare quality; pervasive joblessness,
employment discrimination and reduced employment networks; increased
crime, especially violent crime; declining and poorly maintained housing stock
and devaluation of home values; and difficulty building wealth and experiencing
economic mobility. 43

A strong barrier to mobility is the structure for bringing a disparate claim
under the Fair Housing Act of 1968 per the United States Supreme Court’s
opinion in Texas Department of Housing & Community Affairs v. Inclusive
Communities Project. 44 The next Part discusses this holding to illustrate how the
housing system is inherently cyclical with respect to racial oppression.
III. HOUSING AND DISPARATE IMPACT
Congress enacted the FHA, which, among other things, makes it unlawful
to discriminate against a person based on their race in the acquisition or
financing of housing. 45 Disparate impact housing claims had been permissible
39. Neighborhood Poverty, supra note 23 (“In 2019, 16 percent of people of color lived in
high-poverty neighborhoods compared to 4 percent of the white population.”).
40. Anita Arora et al., Identifying Characteristics of High-Poverty Counties in the United
States with High Well-Being: An Observational Cross-Sectional Study, BMJ OPEN, Sept. 17, 2020,
at 1.
41. Id.
42. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urb. Dev., supra note 26.
43. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OVERVIEW OF COMMUNITY CHARACTERISTICS IN
AREAS WITH CONCENTRATED POVERTY (2014).
44. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affs. v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project Inc., 576 U.S. 519, 545
(2015).
45. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (2018). The “state action” reasoning in Shelley is “one of the most
controversial and problematical decisions in all of constitutional law.” See GEOFFREY R. STONE ET
AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1617 (2d ed. 1991). Almost all other housing cases have refused to
apply Shelley’s constitutional reasoning. See, e.g., Golden Gateway Ctr. v. Golden Gateway
Tenants Ass’n, 29 P.3d 797, 810 (Cal. 2001) (refusing to apply the First Amendment to a
condominium association’s restrictive rules, concluding that Shelley “has largely limited this
holding to the facts of those cases” and citing David Cole, Federal and State “State Action”: The
Undercritical Embrace of a Hypercriticized Doctrine, 24 GA. L. REV. 327, 353 (1990)).
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by lower courts for decades. 46 In its most recent pronouncement on racial
segregation in housing, the U.S. Supreme Court, in its Inclusive Communities
Project opinion, emphasized the country’s “historic commitment to creating an
integrated society.” 47 In Inclusive Communities Project, the Supreme Court
considered whether the FHA’s prohibition of “discriminat[ion] . . . because of
race” encompasses claims of “disparate impact”—claims based on statistical
evidence alone—or if intentional discrimination was required. 48
The Court in Inclusive Communities Project found disparate impact in
violation of the FHA because the Texas Department of Housing and Community
Affairs was responsible for situating most Dallas public and affordable housing
developments in Black neighborhoods. 49 Though the High Court found
disparate impact to be cognizable under the FHA, the Justices emphasized how
difficult it would be for a future plaintiff to win a disparate impact case in this
context. 50 The Court emphasized the importance of a comprehensive showing
of causation between a particular housing policy and the disparate impact and
stated that it would be nearly impossible to prove that a single practice or
housing decision could be attributed to disparate impact. 51 The inability to rely
on statistical anomalies in and of themselves complicates disparate impact under
the FHA. 52
Neighborhood poverty produces physical and mental ailments,
disproportionately so with respect to people of color. 53 Residential clusters in
these impoverished neighborhoods eases the ability of politicians to engage in
racial gerrymandering, despite the illegality of this act. 54 The VRA, like the
FHA, allows for a plaintiff to challenge relevant laws which have a disparate
impact on people based on their race. 55 Yet, the laws passed and proposed
weaken the voting strength of Black people, which undermines the intended
impact of the FHA. 56

46. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affs., 576 U.S. at 536.
47. Id. at 545 (quoting Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S.
701, 797 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)).
48. Id. at 545–65 (quoting Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551
U.S. 701, 797 (2007).
49. Id. at 526.
50. Id. at 542.
51. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affs., 576 U.S. at 527, 542–43 (stating “if a statistical
discrepancy is caused by factors other than the defendant’s policy, a plaintiff cannot establish a
prima facie case, and there is no liability.”).
52. Id. at 542.
53. Shin Bin Tan et al., supra note 17, at 237.
54. Neighborhood Poverty, supra note 23.
55. 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (2014).
56. Brnovich v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 141 S. Ct. 2321, 2351 (2021) (Kagan, J.,
dissenting).
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IV. VOTING AND DISPARATE IMPACT
A central tenet of the VRA is to prohibit racial discrimination so that people
of color are able to have meaningful participation in the political process. 57
Section 2 of the VRA prohibits racially discriminatory standards, practices, or
procedures with respect to voting, 58 and provides that relief for any such policies
may be granted if they are intentionally discriminatory 59 or have a disparate
impact on people of color. 60 To prevail on a claim of intentional discrimination,
the plaintiff must prove that the law or practice was purposefully enacted to
dilute the voting power of communities of color. 61 A showing of disparate
impact requires proving that a practice adversely and negatively affects people
of color as a result of the totality of the circumstances as set forth by nine factors
outlined by the Court in Thornburg v. Gingles. 62
In order for a plaintiff to successfully show voter dilution under Section 2
of the VRA, a prima facie case must be demonstrated, and this requires: (1) the
community of color allegedly disenfranchised is “sufficiently large and

57. Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (“[W]ealth or fee paying has . . .
no relation to voting qualifications; the right to vote is . . . too fundamental to be so burdened or
conditioned.”).
58. 52 U.S.C. §§ 10303(f)(2), 10310(c)(3)); see U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV § 1 (“The right of
citizens of the United States to vote . . . shall not be denied or abridged . . . by reason of failure to
pay any poll tax or other tax.”).
59. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977).
60. See Farrakhan v. Gregoire, 623 F.3d 990, 993 (9th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (“[P]laintiffs
bringing a section 2 VRA challenge to a felon disenfranchisement law . . . must at least show that
the criminal justice system is infected by intentional discrimination or that the felon
disenfranchisement law was enacted with such intent.”); Simmons v. Galvin, 575 F.3d 24, 41 (1st
Cir. 2009) (“Congress has excepted from the reach of the VRA protections from vote denial for
claims against a state which disenfranchises incarcerated felons.”); Hayden v. Pataki, 449 F.3d 305,
322–23 (2d Cir. 2006) (en banc) (holding that the VRA does “not encompass felon
disenfranchisement laws” because of the “wealth of persuasive evidence that Congress . . . never
intended to extend the coverage of the [VRA] to felon disenfranchisement provisions.”); Johnson
v. Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1233–34 (11th Cir. 2005) (en banc).
61. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 32 (1986).
62. Id. at 36–37 (The nine factors are: (1) “The extent of any history of official discrimination
in the jurisdiction that touched the right of minorities to register, vote, or otherwise participate in
the electoral process;” (2) “The extent to which voting in elections is racially polarized;” (3) “The
extent to which the jurisdiction has used unusually large election districts, majority vote
requirements, anti-single shot provisions, or other voting practices that may enhance the
opportunity for discrimination;” (4) “Whether minority candidates have been denied access to any
candidate slating process;” (5) “The extent to which minorities in the jurisdiction bear the effects
of discrimination in education, employment, and health that hinder their ability to participate
effectively in the political process;” (6) “Whether political campaigns have been characterized by
overt or subtle racial appeals;” (7) “The extent to which minorities have been elected to public
office;” (8) “Whether there is a significant lack of responsiveness by elected officials to minorities;”
and (9) “Whether the policy behind the use of the voting practice in question is tenuous.”).
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geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district;” 63
(2) the community is “politically cohesive;” 64 and (3) the white voters vote “as
a bloc to enable it . . . usually to defeat the [community of color’s] preferred
candidate.” 65 Upon establishing a prima facie case, the plaintiff must then prove
voter dilution by a totality of the circumstances using the nine factors outlined
in Gingles. 66
The Equal Protection Clause prohibits states from intentionally
discriminating on the basis of race with respect to the creation of voting
districts. 67 It is important to understand how redistricting can facilitate racial
discrimination through a source of low-income/minority voter suppression
known as gerrymandering. 68 Gerrymandering allows the majority party in each
state to draw legislative and congressional districts to maximize their number of
seats. 69 These districts can cut through neighborhoods and zig-zag through
cities, concentrating people of the same race in the same districts. 70
Gerrymandering can ensure that parties with hardly half the popular vote in the
entire state can secure nearly all of the congressional seats. 71 This is due to
racially polarized voting. Racially polarized voting “increases the vulnerability
of racial minorities to discriminatory changes in voting law” 72 because a law that
is enacted with the purpose of diminishing the voting strength of Black people
will not have its intended discriminatory effect unless racial groups vote as a
bloc. 73 Republicans have won at least a plurality of the white vote, and
Democrats have won the majority of the Black vote in every presidential election
since the VRA was passed. 74 However, racial bloc voting is not limited to federal
63. Id. at 50.
64. Id. at 51.
65. Id.
66. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 36.
67. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 642 (1993) (deciding that racial gerrymandering and
redistricting is subject to strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
68. See Bloomberg, Congressional Gerrymandering Is Voter Suppression, Too, WASH. POST
(Sept. 7, 2021, 1:19 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/congressional-gerrymander
ing-is-voter-suppression-too/2021/09/07/f2f0a394-0fff-11ec-baca-86b144fc8a2d_story.html.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See, e.g., id. (explaining Republicans in Ohio only earn little more than half of total votes,
but consistently win twelve out of fifteen House seats).
72. Shelby Cnty. Ala. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 578 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also
N.C. State Conf. of the NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 222 (4th Cir. 2016) (“Racially polarized
voting is not, in and of itself, evidence of racial discrimination. But it does provide an incentive for
intentional discrimination in the regulation of elections.”).
73. McCrory, 831 F.3d at 221.
74. See Stephen Ansolabehere et al., Race, Region, and Vote Choice in the 2008 Election:
Implications for the Future of the Voting Rights Act, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1385, 1401 n.71, 1405
(2010) (examining racial voting patterns in the 1968 through 2008 elections); Alec Tyson & Shiva
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elections. 75 It also happens in elections at state and local levels. 76 One study
presented findings of racially polarized voting in 105 cases between 1982 and
2006. 77
The coalescence of segregation and voter suppression manifests in
redistricting when the votes of Black people are diluted through “packing”
and/or “cracking.” 78 The concentration of Black people in a single district for
the purpose of reducing a more broad political influence of that group is
“packing.” 79 “Cracking” happens when district boundaries separate people
along racial lines, which results in the inability of the community to hold a
majority, and thus prevail in an election, in any district. 80 The Gingles Court
announced three “necessary preconditions” for statutory voter dilution claims,
focusing on determining if a racial group is residentially segregated and if there
is racially polarized voting. 81 First, the group must be “sufficiently large and
geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district.” 82
Second, the group must be “politically cohesive.” 83 And third, white bloc voting
must “usually . . . defeat the minority’s preferred candidate.” 84 In Gingles, the
Court reiterated the strong relationship between geography and representation
through elections, where 85 more pronounced residential segregation is more
likely to show of sufficient largeness. 86
The recent Supreme Court case Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee
illustrates how courts can either easily prioritize the facial neutrality of laws over
their discriminatory impact or circumvent the disparate impact entirely in favor
of protecting states’ rights against voter fraud, regardless of how non-substantive
the fraud claims may be. 87 The complications in prevailing under the VRA are
Maniam, Behind Trump’s Victory: Divisions by Race, Gender, Education, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Nov.
9, 2016), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/11/09/behind-trumps-victory-divisions-byrace-gender-education/.
75. See Ellen Katz et al., Documenting Discrimination in Voting: Judicial Findings Under
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act Since 1982, 39 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 643, 757 tbl.b (2006)
(noting 105 lawsuits led to courts reviewing Gingles factors to find that racial bloc voting, or racial
polarization in voting, occurred).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 657.
78. See, e.g., Gill v. Whitford, 138 S.Ct. 1916, 1923–24, 1930–31 (2018).
79. Id. at 1924.
80. Id.
81. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50 (1986).
82. Id. at 50.
83. Id. at 51.
84. Id. at 51.
85. See Heather K. Gerken, Understanding the Right to an Undiluted Vote, 114 HARV. L. REV.
1663, 1689–90 (2001).
86. See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Race, Place, and Power, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1323, 1342–
43 (2016).
87. Brnovich v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 141 S. Ct. 2321, 2343 (2021).
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not limited to proving voting laws have an adverse and disparate impact on
Black people. 88 A recent Supreme Court decision removed federal oversight in
the implementation of new voting laws. 89 The Supreme Court’s Shelby County
decision declared unconstitutional Section 4(b) of the VRA. 90 That section set
forth a formula for determining jurisdictions with a history of racial
discrimination; the voting laws for offending jurisdictions were then subject to
preclearance by the federal government. 91 Section 4(b) provided the formula for
determining whether a state had a history of racial discrimination in voting
sufficient to require the jurisdiction’s voting laws be subject to federal
government oversight. 92 Section 5 of the VRA set out the preclearance
requirements for enforcement of these state laws. 93
Since the Court decided Section 4(b) was antiquated and unnecessary given
voter history and the diversity of elected officials in jurisdictions historically
subject to oversight, a state may now enact laws that adversely impact Black
people, and there is no recourse under Section 5 of the VRA. 94 Improvement
based on limited metrics for a specific period of time fails to translate into racial
equity in the democratic process. 95 In the wake of the Shelby County decision,
a number of states, such as North Carolina, Montana, Texas, Alabama,
Mississippi, and Virginia passed restrictive voting laws. 96 Without the
preclearance requirements, jurisdictions have closed polling stations, reduced
early voting options, arbitrarily purged voter rolls, and imposed strict voter
identification laws. 97 All of these measures have created obstacles to voting for
many Black people. 98 Studies of election laws have shown that voter turnout is
reliant, in large part, on voter identification and flexible polling locations and
voting times. 99
88. See id. at 2347.
89. Shelby Cnty. Ala. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 534–35, 557 (2013).
90. Id. at 557.
91. Id. at 546.
92. Id. at 534–35.
93. Id. at 550.
94. Shelby Cnty. Ala., 570 U.S. at 563.
95. Id. at 578–79 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
96. Christopher S. Elmendorf & Douglas M. Spencer, Administering Section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act After Shelby County, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2143, 2146 (2015); see also S.B. 93, 67th
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mont. 2021).
97. Catalina Feder & Michael G. Miller, Voter Purges After Shelby, 48 AM. POLS. RSCH. 687,
688 (2020); Thomas L. Brunell & Whitney Ross Manzo, The Voting Rights Act After Shelby County
v. Holder: A Potential Fix to Revive Section 5, TRANSATLANTICA, 2015, at 1, 2–3; Voting Laws
Roundup: October 2021, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Oct. 4, 2021), https://www.brennancenter.org
/our-work/research-reports/voting-laws-roundup-october-2021.
98. Brunell & Manzo, supra note 97, at 3.
99. See Quan Li et al., Cost of Voting in the American States, 17 ELECTION L.J. 234, 240–41
(2018) (examining thirty-three state election laws to determine the effect of the laws on
participation in the electoral process).
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It is evident that this overly optimistic depiction of a post-racial America
either dismissed or failed to anticipate the onslaught of restrictive voting laws
that would follow, culminating in a great number of voter suppression initiatives
following the 2020 presidential election. 100 Over the last twenty years, there
have been many rules and laws put in place by state and local legislatures that
have made it exceedingly difficult for Black people and people living at or below
the poverty line to cast their vote at the polls. 101 For instance, legislatures have
shortened voting times, passed stricter identification requirements, and put in
place registration restrictions. 102 Many of these laws and regulations appear to
be neutral on their face but are designed to inhibit access to the polls for lowincome and Black individuals. 103 Voter identification laws have made voter
registration drives much less effective by requiring registration documents that
many people do not carry with them. 104 Some of these voter restriction laws can
carry serious penalties; for example, Georgia recently passed a law that makes
it a crime to hand out food and water to voters in line at the polls. 105 In addition,
voting laws in our country differ so greatly from state-to-state and from regionto-region that it is very difficult to be an educated voter. 106 Moreover, the laws
in each state change so regularly that it is nearly impossible to keep up with the
current laws. 107
Most of the recent changes in voting laws claim to increase security in the
voting process, but laws that include identification requirements and strict
closing times for polls have a disproportionate impact on low-income
populations and Black people. 108 The foundation of these laws can be traced
back through the history of our country, beginning with the institution of slavery
in the American South. 109 After the Civil War, the southern states created “Jim
Crow laws” and enacted laws like the poll tax, literacy requirements, and
more. 110 These laws were designed to limit the impact of the Black vote and to
keep control in the hands of white individuals. 111 The laws that many states have
100. Shelby Cnty. Ala., 570 U.S. at 563.
101. Valencia Richardson, Voting While Poor: Reviving the 24th Amendment and Eliminating
the Modern-Day Poll Tax, 27 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 451, 452 (2020).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 458.
104. Id. at 459.
105. S.B 202, 2021-2022 Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2021).
106. See Richardson, supra note 101, at 461.
107. See id. at 458.
108. Block the Vote: How Politicians are Trying to Block Voters From the Ballot Box, AM. C.L.
UNION (Aug. 18, 2021), https://www.aclu.org/news/civil-liberties/block-the-vote-voter-suppres
sion-in-2020/.
109. Farrell Evans, How Jim Crow-Era Laws Suppressed the African American Vote for
Generations, HIST. (May 13, 2021), https://www.history.com/news/jim-crow-laws-black-vote.
110. Id.
111. Id.
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recently enacted are designed to further the same goal, and although they do not
appear racial or biased, they have the same effect. 112 In the last year,
approximately nineteen states enacted thirty-three laws to impose more stringent
identification standards for absentee ballots, limit ballot drop boxes, and shorten
runoff elections. 113
In addition to negatively affecting participation in the political process,
restrictive voting both directly and indirectly produces negative health
outcomes. 114 Further, these effects are compounded because there is a positive
correlation between being uninsured and being affected by restrictive voting
barriers. 115 Americans who are from lower income, Black, or Latino
backgrounds are less likely to be insured compared to higher income or white
individuals, 116 so there are reverberating racial impacts. 117 Lower voter turnout
is more prevalent among people who have poor health, as evidenced by
hospitalization rates, chronic health conditions, 118 mortality 119 and other health
risk behaviors. 120 Racial health disparities are positively associated with lower
voter turnout. 121
A more direct correlation among health, race, and voting is illustrated by a
study that found 2.7 million excess Black deaths due to racial inequality from
1970-2004, which led to the loss of one million Black votes in the 2004
election. 122 This study also determined that many close state-level elections in
the United States during this time likely would have had different electoral
outcomes if not for these deaths attributed to racism. 123

112. See Voting Laws Roundup: October 2021, supra note 97.
113. Id.
114. Roman Pabayo et al., Barriers to Voting and Access to Health Insurance Among US
Adults: A Cross-Sectional Study, LANCET REG’L HEALTH AMS., Oct. 2021, at 1, 1.
115. Id.
116. George L. Wehby & Wei Lyu, The Impact of the ACA Medicaid Expansions on Health
Insurance Coverage Through 2015 and Coverage Disparities by Age Race/Ethnicity, and Gender,
53 HEALTH SERVS. RSCH. 1248, 1250, 1269 (2018); AMY E. CHA & ROBIN A. COHEN, NAT’L CTR.
FOR HEALTH STAT., REASONS FOR BEING UNINSURED AMONG ADULTS AGED 18–64 IN THE
UNITED STATES, 2019 (2020).
117. Wehby & Lyu, supra note 116, at 1248.
118. Parissa J. Ballard et al., Impacts of Adolescent and Young Adult Civic Engagement on
Health and Socioeconomic Status in Adulthood, 90 CHILD DEV. 1138, 1140 (2019).
119. Chloe L. Brown et al., Voting, Health and Interventions in Healthcare Settings: A Scoping
Review, PUB. HEALTH REVS., July 2020, at 1, 4.
120. Id.
121. Kerry Ard et al., Two Mechanisms: The Role of Social Capital and Industrial Pollution
Exposure in Explaining Racial Disparities in Self-Rated Health, INT’L J. ENV’T RSCH. & PUB.
HEALTH, Oct. 2016, at 1, 9.
122. Rodriguez et al., supra note 7, at 196.
123. Id. at 196–97.
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Removing barriers to voting would increase racial health equity. 124
However, there has been an increase in these barriers in the last year. 125 In 2021,
approximately thirty-four laws that restricted voting access were passed in
nineteen states, and more than 440 bills were introduced in 2021 legislative
sessions. 126 Thirty-five such laws were introduced in 2020. 127 Laws erecting
barriers to voting disproportionately impact individuals from low-income
households, racial minority groups, and younger United States residents. 128 As
Roman Pabayo et al. noted, “[b]arriers to voting take many forms, including
laws allowing certain types of IDs to be used in polling stations that make it
easier for targeted groups to vote (e.g., gun permits) while restricting others (e.g.,
those with student ID cards).” 129 Restrictive voting laws weaken the political
power of Black and Latino populations 130 and people with low or no incomes. 131
V. CONCLUSION
The ongoing conflict between the pursuit of colorblindness and the practical
approach of race consciousness continues to infiltrate the political landscape. 132
Despite the constitutional interpretation by the Supreme Court that generally

124. See Barriers to Voting in Elections Linked to Increased Odds of Being Uninsured, COLUM.
UNIV. MAILMAN SCH. PUB. HEALTH (Aug. 4, 2021), https://www.publichealth.columbia.edu
/public-health-now/news/barriers-voting-elections-linked-increased-odds-being-uninsured
(explaining that there is an overlap in people who are negatively affected by restrictive voting laws
and those who are uninsured, and that increased access to political participation is likely to lead to
the election of officials who advocate for the interest of their constituents).
125. Voting Laws Roundup: October 2021, supra note 97.
126. Id.
127. Pabayo et al., supra note 114, at 1.
128. Id.
129. Id.; see also Theodore R. Johnson & Max Feldman, The New Voter Suppression,
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Jan. 16, 2020), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-re
ports/new-voter-suppression.
130. Paru Shah & Robert S. Smith, Legacies of Segregation and Disenfranchisement: The Road
from Plessy to Frank and Voter ID Laws in the United States, RSF: RUSSELL SAGE FOUND. J. SOC.
SCIS., Feb. 2021, at 134, 135.
131. Jeremy Adam Smith & Teja Pattabhiraman, How Inequality Keeps People from Voting,
GREATER GOOD MAG. (Oct. 29, 2020), https://greatergood.berkeley.edu/article/item/how_inequal
ity_keeps_people_from_voting; see also U.S CENSUS BUREAU, VOTING AND REGISTRATION IN
THE ELECTION OF NOVEMBER 2016 (2017), https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series
/demo/voting-and-registration/p20-580.html (noting in Table Seven that as income declines, voter
registration and voter participation declines); see generally Voting Laws Roundup: October 2021,
supra note 97.
132. Adia Harvey Wingfield, Color Blindness is Counterproductive, ATL. (Sept. 13, 2015),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/09/color-blindness-is-counterproductive/4050
37/.
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requires states to pursue colorblind policies, 133 it is undeniable that the
experience of Black people emphasizes the necessity for race-conscious
policies. 134 This tension should be resolved in favor of race consciousness, and
restoring federal oversight to voting laws, at least in part, would be helpful in
this regard. Many legislative bodies are pursuing election reforms, 135 but there
are several potential changes in the U.S. voting laws that are being considered
by Congress. 136 Many of these new bills seek to advance racial justice,
strengthen American democracy, and limit the new voter suppression laws that
many states have enacted. 137
First, the Freedom to Vote Act, which was introduced to Congress on
September 14, 2021, would require states to hold an early voting period at least
two weeks prior to Election Day, increase the accessibility to absentee ballots
and absentee voting, and make Election Day a public holiday. 138 In addition, the
bill attempts to deter deceptive and intimidating practices aimed towards voters
and restores formerly incarcerated individuals’ voting rights. 139 Finally, the bill
includes provisions that would reform redistricting, modernize voter
registration, reform campaign financing, and promote election security. 140
Essentially, the Freedom to Vote Act is an effort to ensure that states are
complying with the democratic process. 141
Another potential change in federal voting laws comes in the form of the
John R. Lewis Voting Rights Advancement Act of 2021. 142 The John R. Lewis
Act seeks to fill the void left by Shelby County and strengthen the legislation as
a whole. 143
The For the People Act of 2021 is another federal law designed to protect
voter rights. 144 The Act (H.R. 1) passed in the House of Representatives on

133. E.g., Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291 (1978) (stating that “[r]acial
and ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect and thus call for the most exacting judicial
examination.”).
134. Ronald Turner, “The Way to Stop Discrimination on the Basis of Race . . .”, 11 STAN.
J.C.R. & C.L. 45, 86–87 (2015).
135. Voting Laws Roundup: October 2021, supra note 97.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. S.2747 - Freedom to Vote Act, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/117thcongress/senate-bill/2747 (last viewed Jan. 25, 2022); The Freedom to Vote Act, BRENNAN CTR.
FOR JUST. (Jan. 4, 2022), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/freedom-voteact.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. John R. Lewis Voting Rights Advancement Act of 2021, H.R. 4, 117th Cong. (2021).
143. Voting Laws Roundup: October 2021, supra note 97.
144. For the People Act of 2021, H.R. 1, 117th Cong. (2021).
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March 3, 2021, and was introduced to the Senate on March 11, 2021. 145 If
passed, H.R. 1 “would make it easier to vote in federal elections, end
congressional gerrymandering, overhaul federal campaign finance laws,
increase safeguards against foreign interference, strengthen government ethics
rules, and more.” 146 Many of the changes would go into effect for the November
2022 elections; however, some may take longer to install. 147
Suppressing the Black vote is a form of structural racism, 148 which
complicates the individual mandates to “vote with your feet” 149 and “pull
yourself up by your bootstraps.” 150 The country’s history of racist laws designed
to intimidate and dissuade Black votes are well-documented, and such laws have
been increasingly promoted under the guise of election integrity. 151
Furthermore, suppressing voting rights reduces the quality of life and actual lives
of Black people through reinforcing racial health disparities. 152 The nature of
segregation permitting voter dilution, and the fact that disparate impact belies
actionable change, require a more present government in order to achieve equity.
Repealing and reducing restrictive voter laws increases voter turnout, 153 and the
federal government should act to promote a true democracy and truly integrated
living patterns.
145. H.R. 1 – For the People Act of 2021, CONGRESS.GOV., https://www.congress.gov/bill/
117th-congress/house-bill/1 (last visited Jan. 25, 2022).
146. Annotated Guide to the For the People Act of 2021, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Mar. 18,
2021), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/policy-solutions/annotated-guide-people-act2021.
147. Id.
148. Danyelle Solomon et al., Systematic Inequality and American Democracy, CTR. FOR AM.
PROGRESS (Aug. 7, 2019), https://www.americanprogress.org/article/systematic-inequality-ameri
can-democracy/.
149. Somin, supra note 2, at 1090.
150. Assari, supra note 3.
151. See Hannah Knowles, A Texas Bill Drew Ire for Saying It Would Preserve ‘Purity of the
Ballot Box.’ Here’s the Phrase’s History, WASH. POST (May 9, 2021, 3:02 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/history/2021/05/09/texas-purity-ballot-box-black/ (describing
the history of the term); see also Joseph Tanfani & Jarrett Renshaw, Challengers, Observers and
Electioneering: The History and Rules of U.S. Poll Watching, REUTERS (Oct. 7, 2020, 5:11 AM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-poll-watchers-facts-expl/challengers-observersand-electioneering-the-history-and-rules-of-u-s-poll-watching-idUSKBN26S1IH. Perhaps the
most infamous example of election observation running amok occurred at the hands of the
Republican Party’s National Ballot Security Task Force in New Jersey in 1981. Abuses resulted in
a consent decree imposed by a federal court requiring the Republican Party to allow a federal court
to review proposed “ballot security” programs. See Consent Order, Democratic Nat’l Comm. v.
Republican Nat’l Comm., No. 2:81-cv-03876 (D.N.J. Nov. 1, 1982); see Peter Baker et al., The
Voting Will End Nov. 3. The Legal Battle Probably Won’t., N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 17, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/08/us/politics/voting-nov-3-election.html.
152. Rodriguez et al., supra note 7, at 195.
153. See Zoltan Hajnal et al., Voter Identification Laws and the Suppression of Minority Votes,
79 J. POL. 363, 376–77 (2017).

